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NOTES
ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY AS AFFECTED BY MALICE AND
NEGLIGENCE
The law assures to every landowner the reasonable enjoyment of his
property., Conflicts between adjoining landowners, each asserting his right
of enjoyment, have long demanded the attention of the courts.
The common law defined many of these rights of enjoyment by the recog-
nition of so-called natural rights, which though technically restrictions on
user, are, of necessity, guarantees of the rights of enjoyment, Acts which
most frequently interfered with the enjoyment of land were forbidden by
holding that an absolute property right existed in the adjoining landowner to
be free therefrom. It is so apparent that violation of one of these rights will
result in injury, that it is natural that we should find that liability for their
violation is not predicated upon negligence or malice. These factors may be
'Ladner v. Siegel, 293 Pa. 310.
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considered in fixing the amount of the damages.
It is clear that no set of rules could be drawn up which would recognize
as naturally existing property rights all the privileges which landowners
might desire in the lands of others. The diverse character of these desired
but not essential rights and privileges made such a task impossible and un-
desirable. To cover this wide field, the law of easements developed. The
same absolute liability for violation was imposed as in the case of a natural
right.
Conflicts which arise as a result of a violation of a natural right or of an
easement are decided easily as the rules of law on these subjects are well
settled.
It must be conceded that interferences with the enjoyment of property
may result from acts which are not justifiable from a moral, social or economic
standpoint and yet are without the restrictions imposed by natural rights or
easements. Most common among these injuries are those suffered by a lower
riparian owner as a result of the diminution of a stream caused by an extra-
ordinary use of the water by an upper owner, and those suffered by land-
owners as a result of a deprivation of light and air, percolating waters or
natural gases. All courts agree that no natural right exists as to any of these
things.
2
At common law no right to be free from these injuries could exist other
then by express grant, or, in certain limited cases, by implication arising from
strict necessity or by prescription. Whether or not a right may exist or arise
by any other method is the subject of this note.
The courts of this country are of two opinions. The great majority hold
with the common law that no property right exists therein. Pennsylvania
and Michigan apparently adopt another view.3
The Pennsylvania viewpoint will probably best be illustrated by ex-
ample. A and B are adjoining property owners. B's house is built only a
few inches from the boundary line. As a result of an altercation, A builds a
spite fence on the edge of his property, thereby depriving B of light and air.
The nature and extent of B's right is in question.
That a property right may exist in light and air and percolating waters,
etc. was early the law of this Commonwealth. In Wheatley v. Baugh,4 the
2See 9 Ann. Cas. 732; Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 325, 152 Reprint 1223; 67 C. J. 837;
Wheatley v. Crisman, 24 Pa. 298; 67 C. J. 690.
sSmith v. Burke, 37 N. W. 838; Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N. W, 381; Peck
v. Roe, 67 N. W. 1080.
425 Pa. 528.
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court asserted the existence of such a right. In that case, a landowner, by
digging on his own land, interrupted the flow of percolating waters which had
formed a spring on the adjoining property. Speaking of the plaintiff's right
to have the water flow through his land the court said :
"The owner of land on which a spring issues from the earth has a per-
fect right to it against all the world except those through whose land
it comes. He even has a right to it against them until it comes in con-
flict with the enjoyment of their right of property."
This right of enjoyment of property was more explicitly defined in the case of
Pfieffer v. Brown, where the court said :
"It is not to be lost sight of that the defendant's right to injure the land
of another, at all, to any extent, is the exception and the burden is
upon him to bring himself within it. His exception is founded upon
necessity because otherwise he would be deprived of the beneficial use
and enjoyment of his own land and unless this would be the substan-
tial result of forbidding his action, he is not within the immunity of
the case."
The existence of a qualified property right in B to be free from these in-
juries, is established by these cases. It is valid and enforceable until its ex-
ercise comes in conflict with a superior right of enjoyment in A. If A can
show that the use which he is making of his property is reasonably necessary
to its beneficial use and enjoyment, then his rights are superior to those of B.
The courts of Pennsylvania have held consistently, although by way of
dicta, that if certain acts of a property owner are to be deemed reasonably
necessary to its beneficial use and enjoyment, it must appear that such use is
made without either negligence or malice.' A typical example of the expres-
sions of the courts is found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,' where the
court said :
"It may be stated as a general proposition that every man has the right
to the natural use and enjoyment of his property and if, while lawfully
5165 Pa. 267.
sHoy v. Starrett, 2 Watts 327; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528; Penna. Coal Co. v. San-
derson, 113 Pa. 126; Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143; Hague v. Wheeler.157
Pa. 324; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368; Penna. Co. v.
Sun Co., 290 Pa. 408; Beckershoff v. Bomba. 112 Pa. Super. 294; Penn. R. Co.. v. Marchant,
119 Pa. 541; Penna. R. Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472,
7113 Pa. 126,
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in such use and enjoyment of his property, and without malice or negli-
gence on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to his neighbor, it is
damnum absque injuria."
There appears to be no case which directly interprets this dictum of the court.
However the language used in the case of Collins v. Chartiers Valley Com-
panys is enlightening.
"It is that the use which inflicts the injury must be natural, proper and
free from negligence and the damage unavoidable. If the plaintiff
showed that the injury was plainly to be anticipated and was easily
preventable with reasonable care and expense then he has brought
himself within the exception of all the cases from Wheatley v. Baugh
to Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Sanderson inclusive."
In other words, if it is shown that the injury inflicted could have been avoid-
ed with reasonable care and expense, the qualified right in the plaintiff to be
free from injury is superior to the right of enjoyment in the party whose acts
result in the injury. This is because the presence of negligence makes the
use unreasonable. Thus the primary requisite necessary to justify injurious
use, i. e. reasonableness, is absent.
Using this interpretation of the language of the courts, their reason for
demanding that the use be "without malice" clearly appears. A man's use of
his property rightfully is considered unreasonable when he should have for-
seen the injury and could have avoided it easily with reasonable care and ex-
pense. It is logical that the court should hold that if a man not only forsees
the injury but actually intends that it should be inflicted, even more certainly
liability will be imposed upon him. Also in cases where the injury is purely
malicious, the party is put to no expense in avoiding it.
It is imperative, that we bear in mind that there are other factors which
bear upon the reasonableness of the use of property other than malice or
negligence. If the use is necessary to the defendant or if he derives a sub-
stantial economic benefit therefrom, the law will hold that the use is reason-
able and the fact that it is done maliciously or negligently rightly is not con-
trolling. Malice and negligence, then, are factors to be considered in determ-
ining the reasonableness of the use of the property. If a person derives a
substantial economic benefit from the use, or if the use has been shown neces-
sary to the enjoyment of his property, then reasonableness has been shown
and his defense established.
$131 Pa. 143.
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It seems that this interpretation invites the most equitable decisions as to
these many controversies between parties asserting conflicting rights of en-
joyment. The law does not place malice or negligence forward as the con-
trolling factors in determining the reasonableness of the use. If a man uses
his property in a way so as to secure to himself the reasonable benefits to
which he is entitled by his ownership, the law will not inquire as to his motive
in so doing. Thus if a man wishes to build a house upon his property but he
can forsee that in so doing he will deprive the adjoining owner of light and
air, he will not be restrained from this improvement of his property no matter
what his motive in sb doing may be. The courts have said that if a use is to
be reasonable, it must be made without malice or negligence. This is said to
enable the courts to restrain injuries inflicted for no justifiable reason and yet
are not prohibited by any generally recognized rule of law.
Objections to the Pennsylvania holding have been advanced by many
courts and upon different grounds. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
has been outspoken in their rejection of the the Pennsylvania theoryY The
late Justice Holmes expressed the reason for the rejection. After citing Penn-
sylvania cases holding that malice may be considered as a factor restrictive of
use of property the learned justice said:
"We do not so understand the common law; and we concede further,
that to a large extent, the power to use one's property malevolently in
any way which would be lawful for other ends is an incident of prop-
erty which can not be taken away even by legislation. It may be as-
sumed that under our constitution the legislature would not have the
power to prohibit the putting up or maintaining of stores or houses
with malicious intent, and thus make a large part of the property of
the Commonwealth dependent upon what a jury might find to have
been the past or to be the present motive of the owner."
With an almost reverent respect for the words of that distinguished
jurist, we submit that he misinterpreted the law of Pennsylvania on this
point. As we have pointed out, the economic benefit and the reasonableness
of the construction of homes and stores assure to the builder the full protec-
tion of the law. The case in which this opinion of Justice Holmes was given in-
volved the same facts as used in the example. A spite fence had been con-
structed. Such a case would fall directly within the operation of the Pennsyl-
vania rule. No economic gain was alleged and no benefits other than the
9Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 12 Am. St. Rep. 600.
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satisfaction of the builder's personal malice. Clearly the presence of malice
here would cause the courts of this state to hold that the use was unreason-
able and thus assert the superiority of the plaintiff's qualified right to light and
air. No prolonged inquiry into the motive of the builder is required. Unless
it appears that the structure is of economic benefit or reasonably necessary to
the beneficial enjoyment of the property, its construction or maintenance must
be either malicious or negligent.
It is often urged that malice can not make unlawful, that which is of its
essence lawful. This is the law of Pennsylvania. This rule is in no way in-
consistent with the law as interpreted above. Injury is of its essence unlaw-
ful. Factors which justify it in cases as the one under discussion, are eco-
nomic gain and necessity to the reasonable enjoyment of property. If the use
is unreasonable then the injury is unlawful. Malice here is but one of the
factors bearing upon the reasonableness of the use. Malice prevents the act
from being shown lawful rather than rendering the act unlawful.
The above then appears to be the state of the law in this Commonwealth
regarding the qualifying effect of malice or negligence upon a man's right to
enjoy his property. The great majority of the states condemn the Pennsyl-
vania view as unsound. It appears that the reasons advanced for rejecting
the Pennsylvania theory are based upon a misconception of the qualified
character of these rights and a misinterpretation of the effect given the presence
of malice or negligence upon those factors which qualify these rights.
Robert Lewis Blewitt.
CONSTRUCTION OF "DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY" EXEMPTION
CLAUSE IN INSURANCE POLICIES
The case of Runyon v. Western Life Ins. Co.1 presents an interesting
problem involving the construction of a clause exempting the insurance com-
pany from liability in certain situations. R took out a life insurance policy on his
own life which provided for double indemnity in case of accidental death un-
less "caused or attributed to as the result, directly or indirectly,2 of any viola-
tion of law by the insured." R was convicted of a felony and was sentenced
to the penitentiary. While there, serving as a cook, he was accidently
1192 N. E. 882 (Ohio).
2Italics added.
